A recent article published by MIT’s specialized journal : technology review, editorialized by Nathan Smit, a writer and analyst for many media in the United States, poses a question as striking as it is complex:
Is it possible to fix the internet?
It is not a failure of the system, but a reflection on how to deal with the negative effects that the network could be generating in today’s society.
A network that was completely distorted from its idea of a potty
By: Gabriel E. Levy B.
What began as an academic essay for interconnecting computers ended up becoming the invisible structure that supports much of contemporary life.
However, it also gave rise to a disturbing paradox: the network that aspired to democratize knowledge and bring people closer together today divides and supervises.
Most video, commerce, public debate, and surveillance circulate through its channels, but central control remains concentrated in very few actors.
From algorithms designed to generate addiction to abusive practices by applications, through massive data exploitation and misinformation, today the internet can be a risky space.
Three influential figures, the thinker associated with the concept of “net neutrality”, an exalted Meta executive and the creator of the web have proposed a series of quite radical solutions to face this problem. Solutions that Nathan Smit has recently taken up in an MIT publication: technology review.
The question is whether they are really the right people to do it. Although each one demonstrates conviction and even creativity, their proposals have important gaps.
In The Age of Extraction: How Tech Platforms Conquered the Economy and Threaten Our Future Prosperity, Tim Wu argues that a small group of tech companies concentrate excessive power and should therefore fragment.
Wu, a renowned professor at Columbia University (New York, USA) and a popularizer of the idea that a free internet requires that all traffic be treated in the same way, believes that existing legal frameworks, especially antitrust laws, are the best way to achieve this.
By marrying economic theory with recent digital history, Wu explains how tech companies went from offering services to users to extracting value from them.
He argues that the collective inability to measure its power has only boosted its growth, displacing competitors in the process.
He affirms that the usefulness and convenience of these tools is precisely the hook that companies use to retain users. “The human desire to avoid unnecessary pain and discomfort,” he writes, may be “the most powerful force there is.”
He mentions the “ecosystems” of Google and Apple as examples, showing how the full integration of services can lead to dependency.
For Wu, this is not negative in itself. The ease with which Amazon allows you to consume streaming content, shop online or organize daily life has clear benefits.
For Nathan Smith, however, when companies such as Amazon, Apple or Alphabet manage to impose themselves without allowing new competitors to enter, the result is an “industrial domination” that for Wu needs to be reconsidered.
For Smith, the solutions that Wu proposes and that seem more viable because they rely on existing economic policies and legal frameworks, include the application of federal antitrust laws, caps on profits that limit what companies can charge consumers and restrictions by sectors that prevent companies from operating in certain areas.
A model that seems to be very similar to those proposed in the regulatory frameworks of the European Union, but as it has shown in these countries, it has a very strong impact on innovation.
Wu claims that antitrust and competition rules are the most effective tools available, recalling that they have already been used successfully against tech companies in the past.
He cites two emblematic cases: the antitrust process against IBM in the sixties, which fostered competition in the software market and facilitated the emergence of companies such as Apple and Microsoft; and the case of AT&T in 1982, which fragmented the telephone monopoly into several smaller companies.
In both scenarios, the separation between hardware, software, and services led to greater competition and more choices for the public.
For Smith, the question is whether this background really serves to anticipate what will happen in the future. It is not clear that these laws work the same in the era of large digital platforms.
The 2025 antitrust case against Google, in which a judge determined that the company should not divest its Chrome browser, highlighted the limits of the law to confront technology companies.
Something similar happened with the case of Microsoft in 2001, which failed to separate the browser from the rest of the company. Wu avoids referring to the latter to defend the antitrust action today.
A totally different look
Nick Clegg, until recently responsible for global affairs at Meta and former deputy prime minister of the United Kingdom, takes a position opposite to Wu’s. He believes that dividing the big tech companies would be a mistake that would harm the user experience on the internet.
In How to Save the Internet: The Threat to Global Connection in the Age of AI and Political Conflict, Clegg acknowledges the dominance of large platforms over the network, but believes that legal sanctions, such as antitrust laws, are counterproductive.
In his view, these problems should be addressed through regulation, for example by establishing rules on the type of content that can be disseminated on social media. It should be remembered that Meta faces its own antitrust process related to the purchase of Instagram and WhatsApp.
Clegg further argues that Silicon Valley should lead its own transformation. He says that promoting transparency, “opening the books” and openly acknowledging decision-making power vis-à-vis users has a better chance of restoring some balance than immediately resorting to legal action.
However, there is no shortage of reasons for skepticism in the face of a former Meta executive who worked closely with Mark Zuckerberg and who, even so, failed to push through those changes from within.
Smith’s analysis of the MIT magazine focuses on showing that in his book he barely mentions some scandals, such as Cambridge Analytica in 2016, but avoids addressing others equally relevant. For example, he criticizes the “fragmentation” of the global internet, without acknowledging the role that Facebook has played in that process.
For Smith, Clegg says that breaking up Big Tech through antitrust laws would stifle innovation and “completely ignores the benefits users get from networks.”
According to him, people stay on these platforms because they find “most of what they are looking for” there, whether it is friends, content or cheap products on sites such as Amazon or eBay.
According to Smith, Wu could partially accept this argument, but it would not agree with the idea that maintaining the current state actually benefits users.
Clegg insists that “the traditional logic of antitrust law doesn’t work” and believes that more moderate regulation can reduce Big Tech’s risks without sacrificing the user experience.
Clegg believes that many technological obligations imposed at the national level, such as Australia’s recent ban on the use of social networks by children under 16 years of age, respond to myths and fears about the impact of technology.
He argues that these rules are often ineffective and distort public perception of social media.
While his argument is somewhat right, it’s unconvincing to read a former Facebook executive reject technological determinism when many have witnessed the damage these platforms can cause.
In any case, Clegg’s defensive posture against social networks will hardly connect with users.
He emphasizes individual responsibility and assures that Meta does not seek to keep people indefinitely on Facebook or Instagram: “The time you spend on the app in a single session is not as important as getting you to come back again and again.”
He claims that the platforms claim to offer “meaningful” content, and not just “a momentary dopamine boost”, although this claim is hardly credible.
Rather than dividing Big Tech, Clegg proposes pushing for full transparency, either voluntarily or with the support of federal lawmakers.
It also proposes that platforms involve users more in their governance processes, for example, through community forums, and that they give them greater control and knowledge over the use of their data.
The look of an old acquaintance on the Internet
On this point, he agrees with Tim Berners-Lee, creator of the website, who proposes a concrete technical reform to achieve this. In his book This Is for Everyone: The Unfinished Story of the World Wide Web, Berners-Lee acknowledges that his original idea of an open, collaborative, and decentralized web is a far cry from today’s reality.
I personally met Tim Berners-Lee at a conference he gave in Madrid about 15 years ago at Ifema, and his speech had a very positive impact on me to better understand the logics and premises on which the internet was founded, even at that time, he proposed new routes for the future of the web that seemed very promising, but of which few have been fulfilled so far.
In Smith’s analysis, for Tim Berners-Lee, one of the few vestiges of the original ideal that shaped the Internet is Wikipedia, which he considers “probably the best example” of what he aspired to create.
Their proposal to return control to users is to give them greater control over their data through a universal “pod” called Solid (“social linked data”).
This system, initially developed at MIT, would provide a central space where people could manage information ranging from financial data to medical records to social media posts.
Instead of that information being scattered across multiple providers, the entire digital trail would be stored in a single private repository.
Solid may seem like an almost miraculous solution in an age marked by constant data traffic and security breaches. The ability for users to see and control “what data is generated about them” is appealing.
However, there are understandable reservations, such as the idea of combining sensitive medical data with information from personal devices.
Despite promises of control and decentralization, recent scandals about the misuse of data such as that of menstrual tracking apps generate mistrust.
Berners-Lee believes that centralizing data in a system like Solid could save time and improve the everyday online experience. He has pointed out that “an alien would think it is very strange to have to tell my phone the same things over and over again”, referring to tasks such as looking for flights on different airlines.
With Solid, everything from vaccination records to card payments could be integrated into that digital vault and connected with multiple apps.
Berners-Lee believes that artificial intelligence would help make better use of that data, for example, by linking meal plans to supermarket spending.
While he’s optimistic about that combination, he expresses doubts about chatbots’ ability to handle personal data securely and responsibly.
In general, Berners-Lee is reluctant to regulate the web, except when it comes to teenagers and social media algorithms, where he does see a clear need.
He defends the right of users to control their own data and is confident that Solid can reorient the web away from its current extractive model.
A compilation of the three views
Of the three proposals to transform the internet, Wu’s is the one that has shown recent results.
Companies like Google have been forced to share data with competitors and face limits on the use of their systems for new products. However, the current U.S. political context raises questions about the continuity of antitrust enforcement.
On one point, Clegg could prevail: curb the proliferation of national laws.
President Donald Trump has announced that he will use tariffs to punish countries that pass rules against U.S. technology companies.
In addition, his position suggests that there will be no greater internal regulation. In fact, the platforms seem to have strengthened: Meta, for example, eliminated fact-checkers and relaxed moderation after Trump’s election victory.
It should be remembered that the US has not passed a major federal law on the internet since 1996.
If the courts fail to enforce antitrust laws, Clegg’s proposal for a U.S.-led global agreement, with common rules on data and human rights, could be the fastest path to progress.
In conclusion, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems facing the internet. But the points on which the three authors agree: greater control for users, more privacy, and greater accountability on the part of Silicon Valley are goals worth fighting for.
The truth is that the Internet long ago ceased to be that open network of collaborative data, to become an oligopoly of Californian companies.
Nathan Smith is a writer and has published in The Washington Post, The Economist and Los Angeles Times.
